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CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS -PLEA BARGAINING-The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that an unconsummated plea
agreement cannot be enforced absent detrimental reliance.
Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1980).
On November 4, 1978, St. Clair Springette and his co-defendant,
Raymond Scotland, were charged with two counts of burglary1 and two
counts of grand larceny.2 At his arraignment on the four counts,
Springette entered a plea of not guilty and a discovery conference fol-
lowed. At the conference, the Assistant United States Attorney was
informed of two other criminal cases pending against Springette, in
which he was charged with grand larceny,3 buying and receiving stolen
property,' and third degree burglary.' The government thereupon pro-
posed a plea arrangement to dispose of all the charges pending against
Springette6 According to the terms of the plea arrangement, Spring-
ette could plead guilty to one count of third degree burglary in either
of the two cases involving burglary and to a misdemeanor in the case
charging grand larceny and receiving stolen property.' The remaining
charges would then be dropped. There were no other conditions to the
entering of the pleas. The government's position on a sentence recom-
mendation was to depend upon whether Springette would be willing to
testify against his co-defendant, Scotland.8
After Springette was informed of the plea arrangement by his
counsel,' he agreed to plead guilty to one count of burglary and to the
misdemeanor of petit larceny,"0 with the understanding that the
charges under the four-count indictment would be dismissed." When
1. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 444(1) (Supp. 1979).
2. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1083(1) (1964).
3. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 1083(1) (1964).
4. See V.1. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 2101(a) (Supp. 1979).
5. See V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 444(1) (Supp. 1979). The charges of grand larceny
and receiving stolen property were docketed as criminal case No. 78-147 and the charge of
third degree burglary was docketed as No. 78-200. Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d
360, 361 (3d Cir. 1980).
6. 614 F.2d at 361.
7. The guilty plea to the charge of burglary could be entered in either the instant
case, No. 78-129, or in No. 78-200. The misdemeanor guilty plea would be entered in No.
78-147. Id.
8. Id.
9. "Springette had different counsel in each of his three cases. The plea proposal was
conveyed by his counsel for the instant case, No. 78-129. Id.
10. The third degree burglary guilty plea was to be entered in case No. 78-200 and
the misdemeanor guilty plea in case No. 78-147. Id.
11. Id.
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the Assistant United States Attorney learned of Springette's accept-
ance of the plea proposal, she advised Springette's counsel that the
government would adhere to the terms of the original plea proposal only
if Springette would agree to make a sworn statement that an earlier
statement made to the police implicating Scotland was true.12 Spring-
ette refused to do so.
13
At trial, Springette made an oral motion requesting that the district
court compel specific performance of the plea bargain agreement. 4 He
contended that the government had impermissibly added a new re-
quirement to the agreement after being informed of his acceptance of
the initial plea offer. 5
Springette's motion was denied and he was convicted on the four
counts lodged against him. 6 Springette appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for reconsideration of his argu-
ment, contending that his acceptance of the initial plea offer 7 entitled
him to specific performance on the terms of that offer. The court of ap-
peals rejected the appellant's contention and affirmed the judgment of
the district court. 8
Writing for the three-judge panel,19 Judge Gibbons rejected the deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Cooper v. United States"0 that a defendant has a constitutional right to
12. Id. at 362. Following his arrest, Springette had made a statement on October 20,
1978, implicating Scotland in the No. 78-219 offenses. The statement had been made under
oath but during the plea negotiations neither the defense counsel nor the Assistant
United States Attorney were aware of this. Id. at 362 n.2.
13. Id. at 362.
14. Id. A motion for specific performance was made immediately after the Assistant
United States Attorney altered the plea arrangement. Memoranda of law on the question
of whether the plea arrangement should have been enforced were filed by both sides by
order of the judge. Brief for Appellant at 6.
15. 614 F.2d at 362.
16. Id. Springette was originally sentenced on January 4, 1979, to five years of con-
finement on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. Later, the sentences were
reduced to four concurrent six month terms. The charges under case No. 78-200 were
dismissed. Brief for Appellant at 2.
17. Springette's notice of appeal was filed on January 4, 1979. On July 25, 1979, his
sentence was reduced to four concurrent six month terms. Brief for Appellant at 2. The
appeal was argued December 7, 1979, and decided February 6, 1980, several months after
his release. 614 F.2d at 360.
18. 614 F.2d at 361.
19. The panel consisted of Judges Gibbons, Weis, and Garth. Id.
20. 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979). In Cooper the defendant agreed to the government's
plea offer when informed of its terms by his counsel, but before counsel could convey the
acceptance to the government, the Assistant United States Attorney withdrew the offer
on the instructions of his superior. Id. at 15. The Cooper court held that the defendant
was entitled to specific performance even if the acceptance was not communicated to the
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specific performance of a plea offer if he accepted the offer before the
government withdrew it." The court in Cooper founded its decision
upon notions of fundamental fairness within the substantive due pro-
cess guarantees of the fifth amendment, as well as upon the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.'
Judge Gibbons rejected the Cooper rationale that an unconsum-
mated plea bargain violates the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel," and moved on to examine the weightier sub-
stantive due process arguments advanced in Cooper.2 Noting that the
United States Supreme Court has recognized and encouraged plea
bargaining," Judge Gibbons addressed the advantages of the plea
bargaining process recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Brady v. United States." In that decision, the Supreme Court found
that the major advantages of plea bargaining for the defendant are
reduced exposure to penalties and the imposition of a lighter sentence.
Society's interests are furthered through prompt punishment which is
usually more effective and which frees prosecutorial time for cases in-
volving more substantial issues. In addition, the Supreme Court
reasoned that a defendant who pleads guilty is considered to be more
remorseful and better suited to rehabilitation.'
In light of the advantages of the plea bargaining process, Judge Gib-
bons addressed the government's contention that the granting of
specific performance of an unconsummated plea agreement would un-
duly interefere with judicial and prosecutorial discretion and discour-
government before the withdrawal. Id. at 19. The court narrowly confined its decision to a
specific, unambiguous, and reasonable proposal made without any reservation related to a
superior's approval, by a prosecutor with apparent authority at that time. Id. The pro-
posal was communicated promptly to the defendant who assented promptly and une-
quivocally to its terms and indicated his assent to his counsel. The prosecutor's attempted
withdrawal was not based on extenuating circumstances that were unknown when the
proposal was extended. Id. See 614 F.2d at 362.
21. 614 F.2d at 362. The Scotland court reviewed the facts in Cooper and found no
significant distinctions between that case and Scotland. Id. at 362-63 & n.3.
22. Id. at 362 (citing 594 F.2d at 18).
23. 614 F.2d at 363. The Scotland court held that a defendant's loss of confidence in
his attorney because of an unfavorable change in the plea bargaining process does not im-
plicate sixth amendment rights. The court further declared that the appropriate sixth
amendment focus is on the defense counsel's performance, not on the defendant's percep-
tions of defense counsel. Id. The court in Cooper had found an obligation in the govern-
ment to negotiate with "scrupulous" fairness in discussing guilty pleas because the
defendant's perception of the process and the reliability of his own counsel could
necessarily jeopardize the effectiveness of counsel's assistance. Id. (citing 594 F.2d at 19).
24. 614 F.2d at 363.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 363-64. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
27. 614 F.2d at 364 (citing 397 U.S. at 753).
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age plea proposals." He rejected the government's argument that
holding the prosecutor to his offer would negate the court's ability to
accept or reject a guilty plea, and pointed out that a court could
always hold the government to its offer and then subsequently review
the plea proposal on its merits to determine whether to accept or re-
ject the plea.' Judge Gibbons did find merit, however, in the govern-
ment's contention that specific performance would discourage pro-
secutorial plea proposals." He reasoned that forcing the government to
be more careful about its plea proposals would not be detrimental, but
might result either in delays in bargaining or in fewer plea proposals.
Such results would diminish the advantages of resource saving, quick
disposition, and quick punishment."
Judge Gibbons next addressed the effect of a remedy of specific per-
formance on prosecutorial discretion. According to the court, the plea
bargaining process implicates the prosecutor's functions as an ad-
ministrator, an advocate, a judge of fairness, and a quasi-legislator.2
Judge Gibbons noted that plea agreements are often likened to uni-
lateral contracts because consideration is not given for the
prosecutor's promise until the defendant enters his guilty plea.' The
court reasoned that because constitutional standards require more
than contract principles, a defendant may withdraw his plea at any
time before officially entering it, or he may withdraw it at any time
after it has been entered if it was not entered voluntarily and know-
ingly. Although agreeing that a prosecutor does not necessarily have
the same rights of withdrawal, the court concluded that to compel
specific performance of an unconsummated plea arrangement would be
an unjustifiable interference with prosecutorial discretion.'
Although Judge Gibbons accepted the government's arguments of
interference with prosecutorial discretion and discouragement of pleas
as persuasive, he found that the "convincing factor" for denying the
appellant's request for specific performance lay in the availability of an
28. 614 F.2d at 364.
29. Id. The court always has the discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea, after it
has thoroughly inquired into the basis for the agreement and the expectations of the
defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
30. 614 F.2d at 364.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea
Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 471, 535 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Westen].
34. 614 F.2d at 364. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978), was reluctant to interfere in plea
bargaining, holding that a prosecutor's threat to bring more serious charges if the defend-
ant did not enter a guilty plea and the subsequent initiation of those charges was not a
violation of due process. 614 F.2d at 364 n.13.
Vol. 19:397
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adequate remedy for breach of an unconsummated plea agreement. He
reasoned that a defendant's right to a trial by jury was a more than
adequate alternative remedy, and that to hold otherwise would belittle
that fundamental right." Judge Gibbons maintained that no rational
basis exists for holding that a trial is sufficient for a defendant who
was not afforded a plea arrangement, and insufficient for one who was.
He reasoned that because the courts cannot compel the prosecutor to
offer a plea bargain, and because Springette did not allege detrimental
reliance, he is in the same position as if he had not been offered a plea
bargain.' Judge Gibbons maintained that if a defendant detrimentally
relies on the government's promise, due process guarantees are im-
plicated."7 Because no such reliance was alleged, the court held that the
defendant's agreement to plead guilty in accordance with the govern-
ment's initial plea offer did not give the defendant a right to specific
performance of the terms of that offer."
Virgin Islands v. Scotland squarely addresses whether a plea agree-
ment can arise before the formal entry of the plea, and whether a
defendant is entitled to compel specific performance for such a breached
plea bargain. The United States Supreme Court was first presented
with a request for relief for a broken plea agreement in Santobello v.
New York.39 The Santobello Court was not faced with whether a plea
agreement can arise before formal entry of the plea because Santobello
had formally entered his guilty plea in reliance on the prosecution's
promises." The Court, however, did address the availability of relief
for a broken plea agreement."' Reaffirming the importance of the plea
bargaining process, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that San-
tobello had a constitutional right to some relief from the state's breach
of the plea bargaining agreement.' The Court, unfortunately, did not
35. 614 F.2d at 365.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
40. Santobello entered a plea of guilty in return for the prosecutor's promise to drop
other charges and to make no recommendations as to sentencing. A new prosecutor, who
was unaware of his predecessor's agreement, was appointed, and recommended to the
court that the maximum one year sentence be imposed. Id. at 259.
41. Id. at 257.
42. Id. at 262. The plurality opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who was
joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Blackmun. Id. at 257. Justice Douglas wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Id. at 263. An opinion, concurring in the decision to reverse,
but dissenting from the decision to leave the choice of remedy to the state court on re-
mand, was written by Justice Marshall who was joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart.
Id. at 267.
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clearly indicate the source of the defendant's right to relief.43 The
plurality sanctioned either the granting of specific performance or
vacatur of the plea, remanding the choice of remedy question to the
state court." Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, argued for a
"constitutional rule" entitling a defendant to relief from broken plea
agreements, where "considerable, if not controlling, weight" would be
given to the defendant's preference for a particular relief." Justice
Marshall, concurring in part, joined the plurality in its finding that
some remedy is constitutionally required but dissented from the re-
mand of the case without any constraints on the nature of the relief.
He argued that where a defendant requests the vacatur of a guilty
plea, he should have an absolute right to that remedy."8 Justice Mar-
shall further stated, in dicta, that in circumstances where a prosecutor
has broken a plea agreement, a defendant may be entitled to compel
specific performance."'
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Santobello provided sup-
port for the position that a defendant's request for vacatur should
generally be granted, 8 four Justices left the impression that a defen-
dant may be able to compel specific performance where a prosecutor
breaches the plea agreement.49 Because the Supreme Court has not
43. Chief Justice Burger did not explicitly state the constitutional basis for the deci-
sion, however, in order for the Supreme Court to have had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1257 (1976), the Court must have been considering a constitutional issue. See Westen,
supra note 33, at 474 n.10. Chief Justice Burger found that relief was required in "the in-
terests of justice" and was an appropriate recognition of the responsibilities held by the
prosecutor in the plea bargaining process. 404 U.S. at 262. The Chief Justice also re-
viewed the traditional requirements that a guilty plea be entered "knowingly and volun-
tarily" Id. at 261. See Westen, supra note 33, at 477-528 for a comprehensive analysis of
the possible constitutional basis on which Santobello was decided.
44. 404 U.S. at 262-63. Although Santobello had requested recision of the guilty plea,
the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, on remand, compelled specific perform-
ance of the plea bargain. People v. Santobello, 39 A.D.2d 654, 655, 331 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777
(App. Div. 1972).
45. 404 U.S. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas' "constitutional rule"
would require vacatur of the sentence where the prosecutor has breached his agreement
and the granting of specific performance if the defendant requests. Id.
46. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 268 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because San-
tobello did not seek specific performance, Justice Marshall found it unnecessary to decide
the issue. Id.
48. Justice Marshall noted that a majority of the Court would seem to grant vacatur
where requested by the defendant. His majority support consisted of the three Justices in
dissent and Justice Douglas who would give "considerable, if not controlling, weight" to
the defendant's preference. Id.
49. Justice Marshall joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, stated that where a
prosecutor has broken a plea agreement, a defendant may be entitled to compel specific
performance. Id- See note 47 and accompanying text supra. Justice Douglas would follow
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reexamined the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to compel
specific performance for a breached agreement, the issue remains
unsettled. Whether specific performance is available to a defendant for
an agreement breached prior to the formal entry of a plea was not
presented in Santobello and also remains unsettled.
State courts and lower federal courts have generally granted
specific performance when a defendant requests it. Some of the courts
have explicitly recognized the need to protect a defendant's expecta-
tions which were unrealized through a broken plea agreement.- Some
have simply cited Santobello as authority for granting specific perform-
ance. 1 Other courts have based their decision on the defendant's
detrimental reliance or on the prosecutor's bad faith.52 Some federal
courts have remanded cases to the state court on the issue of relief,
but in those cases, the defendants have not requested specific perform-
ance of the plea agreement.'
The Scotland court denied Springette specific performance because
of the availability of an alternative remedy. The court reasoned that a
jury trial on the original charges would afford Springette the same
rights that he had before plea negotiations." The court's rationale
would appear to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in
Santobello. In remanding to the state court the option of granting
the defendant's preference. Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring). See note 45 and accompa-
nying text supra.
50. See, e.g., Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d
Cir. 1976) (where defendant relies on promises of prosecutor, he is entitled to have expec-
tations realized; fundamental fairness and public confidence in government officials re-
quire prosecutors be held to meticulous standards); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 322, 294
A.2d 57, 61 (1972) (pragmatic necessity and essential fairness dictate that the state will
not disappoint a defendant's reasonable expectations); Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460
Pa. 528, 533, 333 A.2d 898, 900 (1975) (where prosecutor breaks a plea agreement, defen-
dant is entitled to the benefit of the bargain); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 585,
564 P.2d 799, 803 (1977) (recision of guilty plea and subsequent trial is an inadequate
remedy where prosecutor withdrew his offer and requested that the court rescind the
plea; specific performance was only remedy which protected defendant's expectations).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Alessi, 536 F.2d 978, 981 (2d Cir. 1976) (dictum); Brax-
ton v. United States, 328 A.2d 385, 386-87 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mawson v. United States, 463
F.2d 29, 31 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428-29 (4th Cir. 1972);
People v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 298, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690, 694 (1974); State v.
Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 701, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976).
52. See, e.g., Geisser v. United States, 513 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (defendant
gave information to government at personal risk); State v. Pope, 17 Wash. App. 609, 614,
564 P.2d 1179, 1182 (1977) (where the state has acted in bad faith, considerable weight
should be given to the defendant's choice of remedy).
53. See, e.g., Harris v. Superintendent, Va. State Penitentiary, 518 F.2d 1173, 1174
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730, 735
(3d Cir. 1972).
54. 614 F.2d at 365.
1981
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specific performance, the Supreme Court in Santobello implied that
vacatur and the resulting retrial is not always a sufficient remedy. The
Scotland court noted that the basic estoppel principle recognized in
Santobello might arguably be extended to cover a situation where the
plea was not entered but where the defendant relied in some other
way making a fair trial impossible.' This requirement that detrimental
reliance be found before specific performance can be granted does not
follow from the Supreme Court's reasoning in Santobello. The plurality
in Santobello found that constitutional standards require that the
defendant be treated with fairness throughout the plea bargaining pro-
cess.5 The Supreme Court in Santobello did not address the issues of
the entry of the plea, but founded its decision on the "interests of
justice" and the government's duty to fulfill its promises made during
plea negotiations."
The Scotland court formulated its analysis by examining the Cooper
court's reasoning. In reviewing the substantive due process argument
advanced by the Cooper court, the Scotland court focused on the
recognized advantages of the plea bargaining process.' The court
reasoned that finding a due process right to demand specific perform-
ance of an unconsummated plea might interefere with the prompt
disposition of criminal cases and could delay negotiations which would
result in reduced savings of judicial and prosecutorial resources. To
support its reasoning, the Scotland court relied on Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,59 noting that in Bordenkircher the Supreme Court left to the
discretion of the prosecutor the charges which would be brought
against the defendant.60
The Bordenkircher Court, however, narrowly confined its decision to
the case where the prosecutor presents the unpleasant alternatives to
which a defendant is rightfully subject."1 The prosecutor in Bordenkir-
cher had carried out his threat to reindict the defendant if he did not
55. Id.
56. 404 U.S. at 261.
57. Id. at 262-63.
58. The Scotland court stated that the defendant benefits through reduced exposure
to penalty with a lighter sentence, and society benefits through savings on judicial and
prosecutorial resources. 614 F.2d at 363-64.
59. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In Bordenkircher the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
due process rights were not violated when, to encourage a guilty plea, the prosecutor
threatened more serious charges and subsequently brought an indictment on those
charges. Id. at 365. The Supreme Court stated that "[i]n our system, so long as the pros-
ecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before
a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion." Id. at 364.
60. 614 F.2d at 364 n.13.
61. 434 U.S. at 365.
Vol. 19:397
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plead guilty to the offense with which he was originally charged. In
Scotland, the prosecutor did not use his discretion to choose between
alternative indictments but rather used it to revoke his earlier offer.
The Bordenkircher Court stated that even though broad discretion is
awarded to prosecuting attorneys, there are undoubtedly constitu-
tional limits to the exercise of the discretion in situations where there
is potential for abuse.2
The Scotland court elevated considerations of judicial efficiency and
prosecutorial discretion above a defendant's due process rights, revers-
ing the traditional notion that constitutional considerations are limita-
tions on judicial and prosecutorial procedures. 3 Constitutional rights
are, by definition, rights held by individuals to place limits on the con-
duct of their government." Thus, the Scotland court misdirected its at-
tention to the prosecutorial system instead of to the constitutional
rights of defendants. The issue of when in the plea bargaining process
a defendant's rights arise was lost in the court's concern for pros-
ecutorial discretion. The court failed to recognize the importance of
conducting a judicial system that is fair to defendants, and the necessi-
ty of providing an equitable framework for plea bargaining."
Scott W. Reid
62. Id.
63. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1920).
64. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
65. Stating that plea bargaining has been controversial, the Alaska Attorney General
banned plea bargaining in his state, effective August 15, 1975. See NATIONAL INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING (1980).
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